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1341 
BLIND FAITH OR EFFICIENCY? THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
AND ALL OTHERS ON THE TOPIC OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR1 IMPASSE BARGAINING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), enacted in 1935 and 
amended several times thereafter, governs American labor law.2 Courts 
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have construed the 
NLRA to require that an employer bargain to a complete impasse on all 
mandatory issues of bargaining with an employee representative before 
unilaterally altering the terms and conditions of employment.3 An 
“impasse” is “a state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, 
 
 
 1. Public and private sector collective bargaining are fundamentally different. “Public 
employers—federal, state, and local governments—are not covered by the [National Labor Relations] 
Act.” MICHAEL EVAN GOLD, AN INTRODUCTION TO LABOR LAW 5 (2d ed. 1998). This Note will focus 
upon bargaining covered by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”): private sector bargaining. 
 2. Significant changes to the NLRA since its enactment in 1935 include the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
amendments and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act. The Taft-Hartley Act, enacted to remove the balance 
of bargaining power from labor’s favor, resulted in significant changes to the NLRA. For one, it 
provided employees with a means to change bargaining representatives. The additional findings 
incorporated by Congress into the Policy Declaration of the NLRA (Section 1 of the Act, codified as 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)), indicate that some union practices are detrimental to national commerce and 
the interest of the public. The amendment to Section 7 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)) provides 
employees with the right to refrain from concerted activity. Amendments to the original Section 8, 
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000), listed union unfair labor practices. Further, Section 9(e) was 
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act to allow employees to petition for a union decertification election. 29 
U.S.C. § 159(e) (2000).  
 The Taft-Hartley Act is often viewed as representing conflicting statutory goals. JAMES A. GROSS, 
BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY 1947-1974 272 (1995). The 
Act’s protection of individual rights—specifically, the right to refrain from collective bargaining added 
to Section 7—has been viewed as “statutory justification for both the promotion of a policy of 
individual bargaining and employer resistance to unionization and collective bargaining.” Id.; see also 
infra note 11 and accompanying text. This presents a dilemma in the balance of power between 
workers and management, as many decisions cannot be negotiated on an employee-by-employee basis. 
Hence, the choice may be viewed as one of inclusion in or exclusion from the bargaining process. Id.  
 Another consequence of the Taft-Hartley Act was to create a fundamental conflict in the 
government’s role: Taft-Hartley’s amendments made the government a disinterested supporter of a 
worker’s choice for or against unionization, but retained the Wagner Act’s notion “of the federal 
government as a promoter of collective bargaining.” Id. 
 3. See Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000)) (prohibiting an employer 
from refusing to bargain with the representatives of its employees), Section 8(d) of the NLRA (29 
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000)) (conferring upon employers and employee representatives the mutual 
obligation to collectively bargain in good faith on mandatory terms and conditions of employment); 
see also GOLD, supra note 1, at 41. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1341 Stolzenburg book pages.doc  3/10/2003    
 
 
 
 
 
1342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1341 
 
 
 
 
are simply deadlocked.”4 This stalemate occurs when the collective 
bargaining process fails. Some factors considered in determining whether 
parties have reached an impasse include the bargaining history between 
the employer and unions, the behavior of the parties in negotiations, and 
the topic of negotiations.5 
The Supreme Court has issued several rulings on the topic of impasse 
bargaining; in all instances, it requires an employer to bargain to an 
impasse, absent certain circumstances, before unilaterally altering the 
terms and conditions of employment.6 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has created an exception to the Supreme Court’s policy regarding impasse 
bargaining and the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of 
employment by an employer. Since 1963, the Fifth Circuit has only 
required an employer to give a union notice and a chance for 
counterproposals before instituting unilateral changes in wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit has reasserted its position 
by holding that the Supreme Court’s earlier rule is restricted to a narrow 
set of facts.7 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals attacked the long-
standing philosophy of the Fifth Circuit. In Duffy Tool & Stamping, L.L.C. 
 
 
 4. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 241 (citing NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 
1963)). An impasse is reached when the negotiating parties “have reached ‘that point of time in 
negotiations when [they] are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be futile.’” TruServ 
Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1130 (2002) (citing 
Wycoff Steel, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 517, 523 (1991) (quoting Patrick & Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 390, 393 
(1980))). The employer and employee representatives reach a partial impasse when they are unable to 
agree on a few terms of the entire collective bargaining agreement. For an example of partial impasse, 
see Naperville Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 242 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2001) (failure of employer and 
employee representative to agree upon a subcontracting plan, without disagreement on any other 
mandatory issues of bargaining, termed a “partial impasse”). The parties reach a general impasse when 
the two sides cannot reach consensus on the totality of the agreement. See Visiting Nurse Servs. of 
Western Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 5. In Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enforced sub nom. Am. Fed. of 
Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the NLRB identified five 
factors to be considered in distinguishing an impasse from a bad-faith cease of bargaining: bargaining 
history, good faith of parties in negotiations, length of negotiations, importance of the issue(s) in 
dispute, and “the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations[.]” 163 
N.L.R.B. at 478. 
 6. See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 
U.S. 190 (1991). See also infra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. 
 7. NLRB v. Pinkston-Hollar Const. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1992). In Pinkston-
Hollar, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Litton was 
“limited to the question of arbitrability of post-contract expiration layoffs.” Id. at 313 n.6. The court 
held that because the Litton decision did not explicitly involve an employer giving a union notice of a 
proposed change and an opportunity to make counteroffers, it was inapplicable. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/7
p1341 Stolzenburg book pages.doc 3/10/2003   5:45 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] BLIND FAITH OR EFFICIENCY? 1343 
 
 
 
 
v. NLRB,8 Judge Richard Posner’s decision criticized the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach. In the Duffy opinion, the Seventh Circuit listed several reasons 
why the Fifth Circuit’s policy harms the bargaining process. In addition, 
several other circuits have joined the Seventh Circuit. The NLRB is also in 
agreement with these circuits and has objected to the position taken by the 
Fifth Circuit. 
This Note examines the effects of the Fifth Circuit’s policies on 
collective bargaining. Part II discusses the case history of the circuit split. 
Part III examines the mechanics of collective bargaining as applied to the 
impasse bargaining doctrine, and the Seventh Circuit’s concerns in Duffy. 
Part IV presents arguments to resolve the split on impasse bargaining. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the principle of 
impasse bargaining in NLRB v. Katz.9 In Katz, the Court found that an 
employer’s imposition of unilateral terms prior to impasse is illegal,10 as 
such a practice violates Sections 8(a)(1)11 and 8(a)(5)12 of the NLRA.13 
The Court noted that the NLRB had jurisdiction to impose and enforce the 
impasse bargaining rule under Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.14 
 
 
 8. 233 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 9. 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
 10. Id. at 747. 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000). The section reads: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
Section 157 of this title[.]” Section 7, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000), provides employees the right 
to join a labor organization, the right to participate in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid and protection[.]” Id. A 1947 Taft-Hartley amendment to Section 7 
provided employees with the countervailing right to refrain from joining in concerted activities. 
ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK C. BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW 91 
(13th ed. 2001). Section 7 was also amended to change government’s role from an advocating 
unionization to neutral. Id.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 12. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000) and reads in relevant 
part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees[.]” Id. 
 13. Katz, 369 U.S. at 747. The Court noted that unilateral action by an employer is tantamount to 
a refusal to bargain, and that the NLRB is permitted to stop those actions “which directly obstruct[] or 
inhibit[] the actual process of discussion, or which [reflect] a cast of mind against reaching 
agreement.” Id. Further, the Court stated that unilateral action is seldom “justified by any reason of 
substance.” Id. Such statements led the Court to conclude that the NLRB may regard unilateral action 
as a violation of Section 8(a)(5) without finding that the employer acted in bad faith. Id. at 747-48. 
 14. Id. Section 8(b)(3) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2000)) states in pertinent part: “It shall 
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain collectively 
with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees[.]” 
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Further, the Court noted that bad faith on the part of the employer need not 
be found for a violation of Section 8(a)(5).15 The Court also stated that, in 
some cases, unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of employment 
might be acceptable, but did not specify when the exception applies.16  
The Court further developed its doctrine regarding impasse bargaining 
in Litton Financial Printing Division, Inc. v. NLRB.17 In Litton, the Court 
found that restraints on an employer’s unilateral action may extend past 
the expiration of a collective bargaining contract.18 
B. The Fifth Circuit 
In a line of cases beginning with NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc.,19 the Fifth 
Circuit held that an employer may unilaterally change the terms and 
conditions prior to an impasse on all mandatory issues of bargaining.20 In 
Tex-Tan, the union filed charges alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(5), 
complaining that the employer instituted unilateral changes in wage 
rates.21 The Fifth Circuit held that an employer may change the terms and 
conditions of employment so long as it gives fair notice and discusses such 
changes with the union.22 In addition to the holding, the Fifth Circuit 
stated that Section 8(a)(5) is not violated if a wage increase instituted by 
 
 
The Court treated Section 8(b)(3) as the counterpart to Section 8(a)(5). Katz, 369 U.S. at 747. The 
Court noted that, under its decisions, Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA does not permit the NLRB to “pass 
judgment on the legitimacy of any particular economic weapon used” during the course of genuine 
negotiations. Id. However, the Court did reserve the NLRB’s right to quell behavior that is inimical to 
the process of negotiation and agreement. Id. In Katz, the Court extended its right of intervention under 
Section 8(b)(3) to bargaining issues implicating Section 8(a)(5). Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 747-48. 
 17. 501 U.S. 190 (1991). 
 18. The Court held that a mandatory bargaining clause did not expire with a collectively-
bargained contract. Id. at 204-05. However, the Court restricted its holding, reasoning that arbitration 
is consensual between the employer and representative of employees under the NLRA, and is therefore 
inappropriate for governance under the impasse bargaining doctrine. Id. at 200-01. 
 19. 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 20. Id. at 481. 
 21. Id. at 479. The employer made unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment 
shortly after the union was certified as the bargaining representative in 1959, froze wage changes after 
objections from the NLRB, and again instituted unilateral changes in piece-rate and time-based wages 
during March and April of 1960. Id. 
 22. In the words of the court:  
Of course, before instituting wage changes of a kind which constitute a subject of mandatory 
bargaining, there is the statutory duty to first “meet . . . and confer in good faith . . .” [Section] 
8(d). But it is a mistake to assume that where there has been such discussion and fair notice of 
the employer’s intended actions, it is a violation of the law to institute such changes without 
securing the agreement of the Union.  
Id. at 481. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/7
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an employer does not exceed the wage previously offered to the union.23  
Approximately a year after its decision in Tex-Tan, the Fifth Circuit 
again visited the topic of impasse bargaining. In NLRB v. Citizens Hotel 
Co.,24 the union filed a Section 8(a)(5) charge against the employer, 
alleging a failure to bargain.25 The court ruled in favor of the union, noting 
that the employer failed to consult the union prior to changing the terms 
and conditions of employment.26 
After its decision in Citizens Hotel, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered the 
issue of impasse bargaining several times. In A.H. Belo Corp. v. NLRB,27 
Winn-Dixie Stores v. NLRB,28 and Nabors Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB,29 the 
 
 
 23. Id. The Fifth Circuit found justification for this policy in NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 
337 U.S. 217 (1949). In Crompton-Highland Mills, the Court reasoned that an employer’s unilateral 
imposition of a wage rate not accepted or rejected by the union may not have an adverse effect on the 
collective bargaining proceedings, or may be welcomed by the employees’ bargaining representative 
without adversely affecting the remainder of negotiations. See Tex-Tan, 318 F.2d at 481 (citing 
Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. at 224). To further support this contention, the Fifth Circuit 
stated: “Nothing prevented the employer at any time from changing for the future the wages he would 
pay. . . . The pendency of a negotiation for a collective contract would not destroy the employer’s right 
in this regard.” Id. (citing NLRB v. Whittier Mills, 111 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1940)). The Fifth 
Circuit also found support for this contention in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). In Katz, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the employer instituted a new system of wage increases and 
changes in the sick leave plan, recognized than an employer may grant wage increases no higher than 
those previously offered to the union, and, in a footnote, referred to NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain, 
192 F.2d 144, 150-52 (7th Cir. 1951), a case in which the Seventh Circuit held that a wage increase 
less than the union’s demand could be enacted during bargaining. Tex-Tan, 318 F.2d at 481 (citing 
Katz, 369 U.S. at 745 n.12.) 
 The Fifth Circuit focused upon employers’ rights to rationalize its holding. It began by noting that 
the law does not force agreement upon the employer and the employee bargaining representative. 318 
F.2d at 482. The court then built upon this observation, noting that in situations of deadlock, the parties 
have significant latitude for unilateral action. Id. The court then opined that the operative fact was the 
existence of impasse, not its cause. Id. It further noted that a genuine deadlock that does not result 
from bad-faith bargaining should not render an employer helpless. Id.  
 24. 326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 25. The union filed a Section 8(a)(5) charge because the employer discontinued Christmas 
bonuses without first consulting the union. Id. at 504-05. 
 26. Id. at 505. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit revisited and expanded upon the 
principles described in Tex-Tan. First, the court noted that a union does not have absolute veto power 
over changes instituted by the employer. Id. The court then reiterated its holding from Tex-Tan, stating 
that negotiations need not reach an impasse for an employer to unilaterally institute changes in the 
terms and conditions of employment, provided that the union has been consulted for counterproposals 
and counterarguments prior to the imposition of the change. Id. 
 27. 411 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). This case again showed the 
Fifth Circuit’s method of distinguishing Katz from its own policy: in Katz, the employer failed to 
provide notification prior to instituting unilateral changes. 411 F.2d at 971. With such notification, 
unilateral changes are acceptable. Id. 
 28. 567 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that employer violated its Section 8(a)(5) 
duty to bargain by unilaterally granting increased insurance benefits and wages without first notifying 
the union and distinguishing this case from its earlier holdings in Tex-Tan and A.H. Belo.) 
 29. 910 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1990). Nabors Trailers affirmed “the vitality of the Citizens Hotel 
standard” and held that bargaining need not continue to an impasse, and that a union does not have 
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Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Tex-Tan and Citizens Hotel and allowed 
employers to institute unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of 
employment so long as the employer notified the union and gave union 
representatives the opportunity to present counterproposals and 
counterarguments. In NLRB v. Pinkston-Hollar Construction Services,30 
the Fifth Circuit read an exception into the Supreme Court’s Litton 
holding, thereby distinguishing its policy from that of the Court.31 
C. The Seventh Circuit and Other Circuits in Accord 
1. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit’s view of impasse bargaining differs from that of 
the Fifth Circuit. Its policy regarding the unilateral imposition of terms 
and conditions by an employer can be traced back to its decision in Inland 
Steel Co. v. NLRB.32 In that case, which is seminal in the interpretation of 
Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a),33 the employer unilaterally established a pension 
plan with the provision that employees over the age of sixty-five would be 
involuntarily retired.34 The union objected, claiming that a pension plan 
was historically a condition of employment and therefore a compulsory 
 
 
absolute veto power over changes instituted by the employer. Id. at 273. 
 30. 954 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 31. See supra note 7. In Pinkston-Hollar, the union filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging 
that the employer violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by unilaterally withdrawing from 
union benefit plans, enrolling instead in its own benefit plans after the expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement. 954 F.2d at 308-09. The NLRB ruled against the employer. Id. at 309. The Fifth 
Circuit reversed, noting that the facts of this case and those in Nabors Trailers were similar. The 
employer and union met several times. After they failed to agree, the employer unilaterally instituted 
the desired changes and the union followed by filing an unfair labor practice charge. Id. at 312-13. 
 Interestingly, in supporting its contention that an employer may unilaterally institute terms and 
conditions of employment prior to impasse, the Fifth Circuit relied on a Ninth Circuit case. The court 
cited NLRB v. Auto Fast Freight, 793 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1986), for a further (and quite narrow) 
exception to the impasse bargaining rule: in the case where union has delayed or avoided bargaining, 
and the employer has provided adequate notice of the proposals it intends to implement, the employer 
is permitted to unilaterally implement its proposals without bargaining to impasse. 954 F.2d at 311. 
Otherwise, the similarities between the positions adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits end—in Auto 
Fast Freight, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer must bargain to total impasse, and may not make 
changes after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement until impasse is reached. 793 F.2d at 
1129. 
 32. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 
336 U.S. 960 (1949). 
 33. See Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National 
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 392-94 (1950), for a discussion of this case as well as 
a discussion of early policy regarding the enforcement of the NLRA, especially Sections 8(a)(5) and 
9(a). 
 34. 170 F.2d at 250. 
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topic of bargaining.35 After reviewing the Congressional history of the 
Wagner Act, the NLRB had earlier sided with the union.36 The Seventh 
Circuit, relying upon the evidence considered by the NLRB, affirmed the 
NLRB’s decision.37 
In Duffy Tool & Stamping, L.L.C. v. NLRB,38 the Seventh Circuit 
articulated its policy regarding impasse bargaining. The union filed a 
complaint under Section 8(a)(5) after the employer made unilateral 
changes in the terms of employment.39 The employer argued that it had the 
power to institute unilateral changes on terms and conditions of 
employment once negotiations reached impasse on any issue.40 In his 
opinion affirming the NLRB’s petition for enforcement,41 Judge Richard 
Posner sided with the NLRB and numerous other circuits,42 expanding the 
circuit split. In Duffy, the Seventh Circuit gave several reasons that an 
employer should not be permitted to impose a unilateral change on the 
terms and conditions of employment before the parties have reached a 
total impasse.43 Specifically, Judge Posner stated two overarching 
concerns: 
(1) [B]y removing issues from the bargaining agenda early in the 
bargaining process, it would make it less likely for the parties to 
find common ground; and 
(2) by enabling the employer to paint the union as impotent, it 
would embolden him to hold out for a deal so unfavorable to the 
union as to preclude agreement.44  
 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. 77 N.L.R.B. at 10. The Board specifically referred to comments by Senator Wagner, who 
played a major role in the promulgation of the NLRA:  
Significantly, Senator Wagner, in addressing the 80th Congress with respect to the 1947 
amendatory legislation, recently stated that the term “condition of employment” as used in the 
original Act was intended to have a broader meaning than “working conditions” and included 
such subjects as “pension plans, and insurance funds which properly belong in the employer-
employee relationship . . . .”  
77 N.L.R.B. at 7 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 3427). 
 The NLRB then found that the contractual provisions of pension plans can be administrated 
through collective bargaining. 77 N.L.R.B. at 10-13. 
 37. 170 F.2d at 251-54.  
 38. 233 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 39. In Duffy, the union’s complaint was predicated on the employer’s unilateral institution of a 
“no-fault” attendance policy after declaring an impasse in negotiations. 233 F.3d at 997. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1000. 
 42. Id. at 997-98. 
 43. Id. at 998. 
 44. Id. 
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The first concern addressed by the Seventh Circuit involved integrative 
bargaining.45 Judge Posner contended that integrative bargaining was more 
productive than bargaining on a single issue.46 The court noted that multi-
issue bargaining was not a zero-sum proposition, as compromise may 
“fund . . . other concessions by both sides.”47 The Seventh Circuit noted 
that significant danger existed for an employer in the use of antagonistic 
bargaining; an employer could undermine a union’s representational 
strength.48  
The second concern involved the union’s power. First, if an employer 
is permitted to undercut the union, it signals to the workers that the union 
is a “paper tiger.”49 A union should not have to admit—and cannot afford 
to admit—that it is powerless.50 However, if the employer may adopt 
policies inimical to the interests of employees, the union is effectively 
powerless.51  
The Seventh Circuit next addressed the union’s power with respect to 
the employer’s making of nonnegotiable demands. More specifically, the 
court considered the infrequency with which nonnegotiable demands 
actually arise.52 The Seventh Circuit noted that nonnegotiable demands are 
rarely of substance and are primarily used as a bluffing tactic; at an 
appropriate price, such demands will be dropped.53 The Duffy court 
 
 
 45. “Integrative bargaining” involves the resolution of several issues at once. Id. 
 46. Id. “[I]t is easier [by using integrative bargaining] to strike a deal that will make both parties 
feel like they are getting more from peace than from war.” Id. 
 47. Id. To illustrate this point, Judge Posner provided a hypothetical. If an employer and 
employee representative are negotiating, and the only topic at issue is wages, then bargaining is a 
“zero-sum game”—a dollar conceded by one party is gained by the other. Id. If other issues are added, 
perhaps one side will make concessions—“pay”—to receive desired concessions from the opposing 
party. Id. This continuous give-and-take, reasoned the Seventh Circuit, will bring the two sides closer 
together, favoring agreement over strife. Id. In its defense, the employer claimed that its unilateral 
imposition of terms did not remove the issue from the bargaining table. Id. The Seventh Circuit 
rejected this claim as fundamentally incorrect, opining that by renegotiating or rescinding, an employer 
will appear weak in the eyes of his workers, and may provide the union with additional support in an 
unfair labor practice proceeding before the NLRB. Id. 
 48. Id. Judge Posner presented the example of a unilateral decision where an employer has to 
expend significant costs, such as terminating a portion of the workforce and “hiring permanent 
replacements under contracts providing for generous severance benefits.” Id. Such a practice is used to 
show that the union is helpless to protect workers. An employer will not abandon a policy, such as this, 
that provides him with the upper hand in bargaining. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 999. 
 51. In adopting such policies, the employer seeks to gain a favorable majority of employees in a 
strike vote or a union decertification election. Id. at 998. 
 52. Id. at 999. 
 53. Id. “Usually this is bluffing, since if the negotiation is truly multifaceted, there is generally a 
price at which the parties will surrender these demands. Anyone who has been involved in a 
negotiation knows this.” Id. 
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extended this logic to the employer’s “no-fault” attendance policy, as it 
seemed highly unlikely to the Seventh Circuit that the employer was so 
entrenched in its attendance policy that a suitable concession by the union 
would not lead to its abandonment.54 Based on the preceding concerns, the 
Seventh Circuit adopted the NLRB’s position requiring an employer to 
bargain to a complete impasse prior to taking unilateral action on 
mandatory issues of bargaining.55 
2. Other Circuits 
In Duffy, the Seventh Circuit favorably cited three decisions from other 
circuits.56 The earliest case to which the Seventh Circuit referred was 
NLRB v. Central Plumbing Co.57 In Central Plumbing, the Sixth Circuit 
upheld an NLRB enforcement order, finding that an employer’s cessation 
of bargaining violated Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.58 In so holding, the 
NLRB (and subsequently, the court) found that no impasse existed.59 
The Seventh Circuit also cited Visiting Nurse Services of Western 
Massachusetts v. NLRB with approval.60 In Visiting Nurse Services, the 
employer made unilateral changes to wages and other conditions of 
employment during bargaining, without having reached an impasse.61 In 
ruling against the employer, and affirming a fifty-year old policy,62 the 
 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 997-98. 
 57. 492 F.2d 1252 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 58. In this case, the employer withdrew from both negotiations and the collective bargaining unit 
after the union rejected management’s final offer. Id. at 1253. In ruling on the union’s unfair labor 
practice charge, the NLRB found that management’s unilateral withdrawal from the collective 
bargaining relationship was a violation of Section 8(a)(5). Id. at 1253-54. 
 59. The NLRB and the Sixth Circuit both noted that rejection of a proposal does not create an 
impasse. 492 F.2d at 1254. The court also rejected the employer’s defense of an illegal union security 
clause, reasoning that the illegal contract clause played no role in the employer’s decision to withdraw 
from the bargaining unit. Id. at 1254 n.3. The court also took notice of the fact that even after the 
employer’s withdrawal from the bargaining unit, negotiations between the employer and the union 
continued. Id. at 1254. 
 60. 177 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000). 
 61. Id. at 56. In Visiting Nurse Services, the employer unilaterally instituted a two-percent wage 
increase and a bi-weekly pay system following rejection of both (a “package proposal”) by the union. 
Id. at 54-55. Several months later, the employer again made two more “package proposals,” including 
wage increases, holidays, and job classifications. Id. at 55. Although the union rejected both proposals, 
the employer eventually instituted nearly all of the terms from both package proposals. Id. 
 62. Cox & Dunlop, supra note 33, at 400 n.47 (citing W.W. Cross and Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 
875 (1st Cir. 1949)). In W.W. Cross, the union complained that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) 
by unilaterally instituting and refusing to bargain about an employee insurance program. 174 F.2d at 
877. The First Circuit upheld the NLRB’s order requiring the employer to bargain over the disputed 
program, noting that the phrase “wages,” as used in Section 9(a), refers to more than just salary 
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First Circuit noted that an employer is normally required to bargain until 
impasse on all issues, except in certain instances.63 The court held that an 
impasse requires more than the mere rejection of a proposal.64 With its 
holding, the First Circuit vehemently rejected the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Pinkston-Hollar,65 which had provided the substantive basis for the 
employer’s position.66 In requiring an employer to bargain to impasse, the 
First Circuit used rationale similar to that adopted by Judge Posner in 
Duffy,67 promoting the virtues of integrative bargaining.68 
The Seventh Circuit also relied on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB.69 In Vincent Industrial Plastics, 
the employer made numerous changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment.70 The NLRB found that the employer violated Sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by unilaterally imposing the disputed 
policies.71 The D.C. Circuit “easily upheld” the NLRB’s ruling that the 
employer’s unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of employment 
 
 
remuneration; rather, it encompasses “direct and immediate economic benefits flowing from the 
employment relationship.” Id. at 878. The First Circuit also stated that, in drafting Section 9(a), 
Congress did not intend it to be limited to topics on which bargaining had previously occurred. Id. The 
court then concluded that insurance plans fall within the meaning of “wages” under Section 9(a). Id. 
See also Cox & Dunlop, supra note 33, at 399-401 for further discussion of this case and other cases 
similar to W.W. Cross that interpreted Sections 8(a)(5) and 9. 
 63. 177 F.3d at 56. The court noted two instances in which unilateral imposition of terms and 
conditions of employment may be permitted: “economic exigencies” and “business emergencies.” Id. 
The First Circuit expressly noted that the employer’s duty to bargain to a complete impasse includes 
situations in which an existing agreement has expired and a new one has not yet been negotiated. Id. 
 64. Id. at 58. 
 65. The First Circuit gave several reasons for criticizing the employer’s reliance on Pinkston-
Hollar: 
First, it is inconsistent with the approach taken by this Circuit. Second, the case is best 
understood as one where the court found that the union failed to bargain and to act with due 
diligence after being given the employer’s proposal. But VNS does not does not argue here 
that the Union avoided or delayed bargaining and so Pinkston-Hollar is, even on its own 
terms, inapplicable. 
Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted). 
 66. Id. at 57-58. 
 67. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
 68. 177 F.3d at 59. In advocating multi-issue bargaining, the First Circuit employed an argument 
almost identical to the one presented by the Seventh Circuit: allowing an employer to remove 
individual issues from consideration diminishes the parties’ ability to productively bargain and reach 
an integrated settlement through compromise. These circumstances then lead one to assume that the 
union is entirely powerless in bargaining. Id. 
 69. 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 70. After five months of negotiations, the employer made four unilateral changes to the terms 
and conditions of employment. Id. at 731. These changes involved “attendance, work duties, working 
hours, and time-keeping.” Id.  
 71. The NLRB found that the employer did not present a suitable economic exigency to justify 
its unilateral change of the attendance policy, and upheld the finding of the administrative law judge in 
regard to the other policy changes. Id. at 733. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/7
p1341 Stolzenburg book pages.doc 3/10/2003   5:45 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] BLIND FAITH OR EFFICIENCY? 1351 
 
 
 
 
constituted an unfair labor practice.72 Since its ruling in Vincent Industrial 
Plastics, the D.C. Circuit again examined and reinforced its policy 
concerning the issue of impasse bargaining.73 
D. The National Labor Relations Board 
The NLRB has always maintained a position counter to that of the Fifth 
Circuit and in accord with the Seventh Circuit and its allies on the issue of 
impasse bargaining and an employer’s unilateral imposition of terms and 
conditions of employment.74 A frequently-cited NLRB decision about 
impasse bargaining is Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.75 In that case, the union 
alleged violations of Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, as the 
employer raised wages over the objections of the union.76 The employer 
relied upon a Fifth Circuit case, Winn-Dixie Stores v. NLRB,77 to justify its 
unilateral action after providing the union with notice and an opportunity 
 
 
 72. Id. at 734. The court cited Litton in applying the standard that an employer must bargain to a 
complete impasse on all issues. Id. The D.C. Circuit also noted that dilatory tactics by a union or 
economic exigencies provide the two exceptions to the impasse bargaining rule. Id. The court found 
that the employer failed to provide notice to the union before instituting unilateral changes in the terms 
and conditions of employment, and that that the union did not waive its right to bargain over the 
changes. Id. at 734-35. In addition, the D.C. Circuit indicated that the employer’s justification for the 
unilateral changes—specifically, the possibility of absenteeism—was not so unforeseeable, nor beyond 
the control of the employer, nor so new as to support the employer’s defense of “economic exigency.” 
Id. at 735. 
 73. See TruServ Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1130 
(2002). In TruServ, the union filed unfair labor practice charges under Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA, claiming that the employer unlawfully implemented mandatory terms and conditions of 
employment prior to reaching an impasse in bargaining, disciplined employees by unilaterally 
implemented regulations, and refused to abide by the grievance procedure. 254 F.3d at 1109. The 
employer implemented its “final offer,” and enforced new work rules and regulations thereunder, after 
approximately six weeks of bargaining with the union. Id. at 1112. The NLRB found in favor of the 
union on all allegations. Id. at 1113. The D.C. Circuit granted the employer’s petition for review of the 
NLRB decision and order on the impasse bargaining issue, but denied the employer’s petition about 
the processing of grievances. Id. at 1109. The court examined whether the employer and union had 
reached an impasse. Id. at 1114-15. Contrary to the NLRB, the D.C. Circuit found that a legitimate 
impasse existed. The court determined that “the bargaining positions of the parties, as expressed by 
their experienced negotiators, indicate[d] that the parties were at impasse.” Id. at 1118. As a result, the 
court found that the employer lawfully implemented its final offer. Id. at 1118 n.11. The court affirmed 
the NLRB’s finding that the employer’s failure to abide by the grievance procedure violated Sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Id. at 1119. 
 74. See Duffy, 233 F.3d at 997 (“The Board . . . has repeatedly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
doctrine, and other circuits have sided with the Board . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 75. 243 N.L.R.B. 972 (1979). 
 76. Id. at 973. The employer submitted the wage proposal to the union in April, 1974, but the 
parties never agreed to implement the increase. Id. at 972-73. In July, 1974, the employer informed the 
union that it intended to implement the increase. Over the union’s objections and threats to file charges 
with the NLRB, the employer implemented the increase. Id.  
 77. 567 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1978).  
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to present counterproposals.78 In finding that the employer committed 
unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1), the 
NLRB noted that the type of bargaining in which the employer engaged, 
and argued was advocated by the Fifth Circuit, “presupposes 
negotiations.”79 The court held that the employer failed to negotiate by 
engaging in “pro forma” or “ritual” bargaining.80 
A second noteworthy NLRB decision on impasse bargaining is Master 
Window Cleaning, Inc., d/b/a Bottom Line Enterprises.81 In that case, the 
union cancelled a bargaining session; the employer then accused the union 
of bargaining in bad faith and subsequently called an impasse.82 After 
declaring an impasse, the employer unilaterally implemented new terms 
and conditions of employment.83 The NLRB found that the employer’s 
behavior during bargaining violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) because 
the parties were not at impasse and the employer did not have a valid 
economic reason for unilaterally implementing the changes.84 In reaching 
its conclusion, the NLRB noted the exceptions to the impasse bargaining 
rule,85 which the First86 and D.C. Circuits later adopted.87 
 
 
 78. In Winn-Dixie Stores v. NLRB, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Tex-Tan in refusing to enforce a 
NLRB order that held an employer’s unilateral imposition of a wage increase violated Sections 8(a)(5) 
and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 243 N.L.R.B. at 973-74. 
 79. Winn-Dixie Stores, 243 N.L.R.B. at 974. In referring to a law review article by Archibald 
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1433 (1958), the NLRB presented a 
discussion that is a seeming precursor to Judge Posner’s opinion in Duffy. In its discussion, the NLRB 
describes the mechanics of bargaining and the effects of an employer who bargains, not with the intent 
of giving and taking, but rather with the intent of providing a final warning before acting unilaterally. 
Winn-Dixie, 243 N.L.R.B. at 974-75. In its discussion, the NLRB objected to “and cannot endorse” the 
policy advocated by the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 974. The NLRB observed that the employer would have 
free rein over the implementation of unilateral changes, regardless of the status of negotiations. Id. 
Such a strategy in bargaining prevents productive negotiations and eviscerates the role of the 
bargaining representative. Id. 
 80. Id. at 975. “Pro forma,” or “ritual,” bargaining is a type of negotiation in which a party has 
no intention of reaching an agreement; the party merely attends to fulfill a requirement, formality, or 
give the impression of cooperation. Id. The NLRB noted, during bargaining, the union “was not so 
much presented with an opportunity to bargain about the wage increase as it was afforded a chance to 
give approval to [the employer’s] decision to grant it.” Id. at 975. The NLRB concluded that the 
employer did not bargain in good faith. Id. 
 81. 302 N.L.R.B. 373, enforced, 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 82. Bottom Line Enters., 302 N.L.R.B. at 373-74. 
 83. Id. at 373-74. The employer refused to contribute to employee pension plans and trust funds. 
Id. 
 84. Id. at 375. In finding that the two parties were not at impasse, the NLRB observed that the 
union and employer bargained on a regular basis, frequently discussing the disputed issues. Id. at 374.  
 85. Id. at 374. The exceptions include a union’s usage of dilatory tactics and an employer’s 
economic exigency. 
 86. See Visiting Nurse Servs. of W. Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1999). See 
also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Vincent Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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Two other recent NLRB decisions on the topic of impasse bargaining 
include Intermountain Rural Electric Association88 and RBE Electronics of 
South Dakota, Inc.89 In Intermountain, the employer declared an impasse 
and unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment after the 
employer and union failed to agree to a new contract before the previous 
contract expired.90 The employer claimed that the union waived its right to 
bargain on certain issues, and therefore implemented the terms of its last 
and final offer.91 The NLRB ruled in favor of the union, noting that the 
union did not waive its rights to bargain on certain issues92 and that an 
impasse did not exist at the time that the employer unilaterally 
implemented its proposals.93 
In RBE Electronics, the union charged that the employer violated 
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by refusing to bargain over 
layoffs, recall of employees, and a reduction in working hours.94 In 
identifying the standards to use in deciding the case, the NLRB referred to 
and expanded the doctrine of Bottom Line Enterprises, identifying 
situations where exceptions to the impasse bargaining doctrine might 
exist.95 The NLRB remanded the case to an administrative law judge for a 
 
 
 88. 305 N.L.R.B. 783 (1991), enforced, 984 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 89. 320 N.L.R.B. 80 (1995). 
 90. Intermountain, 305 N.L.R.B. at 784. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 787. The NLRB found that the last-minute actions of the employer, not the union’s 
behavior, prevented the union from bargaining over the insurance premiums. Id. at 786-87. The NLRB 
also concluded that the union did not waive its right to bargain regarding overtime pay, as the 
employer’s unilateral imposition of terms and equivocal conduct towards bargaining precluded the 
union from utilizing its bargaining rights. Id. at 788. 
 93. Id. Utilizing the five factors listed in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), the 
NLRB found that the employer’s actions in bargaining were to intended to diminish the union’s power, 
thereby undercutting its ability to negotiate with the employer. Intermountain, 305 N.L.R.B. at 788-89. 
Further, the behavior of the employer was found to adversely affect the conditions within the 
“bargaining arena,” making it impossible to reach an agreement or a valid impasse. Id. at 789. See 
supra note 5. 
 94. RBE Elecs., 320 N.L.R.B. at 81. 
 95. Id. The NLRB utilized Bottom Line Enterprises for precedential support both for its position 
on impasse bargaining and to identify the two exceptions to the impasse bargaining rule: a union’s use 
of dilatory tactics and economic exigency. Id. Noting that the economic exigency exception was a 
derivation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz and referring to the NLRB’s decision in Winn-
Dixie, the NLRB indicated that such an exception would be applicable only in “a dire financial 
emergency.” Id. The NLRB observed that it has held that economic detriments such as “loss of 
significant accounts or contracts, operation at a competitive disadvantage, or supply shortages do not 
justify unilateral action.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Despite this observation, the NLRB marginally 
widened the exception, recognizing that during contract negotiations, situations may arise in which an 
employer needs to make a decision before the completion of bargaining. Id. Thus, when “an exigency 
compelling prompt action short of the type relieving the employer of its obligation to bargain entirely 
. . .”, the Bottom Line Enterprises rule is suspended and the employer may act unilaterally if it has 
provided adequate notice and an opportunity to bargain. Id. at 81-82. In describing its holding, the 
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decision, consistent with the modified Bottom Line Enterprises standard 
created in the NLRB’s opinion, as to whether the employer violated 
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1).96 
III. ANALYSIS 
An analysis of the case law of impasse bargaining, and the effect of the 
Fifth Circuit’s view on the bargaining process, requires an exploration of 
several factors. One important factor is the effect of the Fifth Circuit’s 
position on the dispersal of bargaining power.97 The Fifth Circuit’s view 
must also be contrasted with the opinions of other courts and the NLRB; 
specifically, whether its view on impasse bargaining is as harmful to the 
bargaining process as the opposing authority suggests. The advantages of 
allowing an employer unilateral control over the terms and conditions of 
employment in the absence of an impasse must also be examined. Finally, 
the policy considerations of restricting an employer’s use of economic 
weapons in the bargaining process require attention. 
A. The Economic Consequences of the Unilateral Imposition of Terms and 
Conditions of Employment 
1. “Crowding”: The Economic Effects of Unionism on Other 
Industries and Other Sectors of Workers 
Union activity affects other members of society. By refusing employers 
the ability to unilaterally impose terms and conditions of employment 
(most importantly wages), a “crowding” effect may occur.98 Therefore, 
 
 
NLRB stated that it attempted to balance the union’s right to bargain with the employer’s right to 
conduct business, but that the employer’s right to use this exception is circumscribed, and that the 
employer must show that the exigency was caused by uncontrollable events. Id. at 82. 
 96. Id. at 83. 
 97. Bargaining power is defined as “the relative ability of the parties in a conflict situation to 
achieve their respective goals.” Susan L. Dolin, Lockouts in Evolutionary Perspective: The Changing 
Balance of Power in American Industrial Relations, 12 VT. L. REV. 335, 340 (1987). 
 98. An econometric comparison of unionized and nonunionized sectors in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco provides more insight into this concept. Lawrence M. Kahn, The Effect of Unions on the 
Earnings of Nonunion Workers, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. R. 205 (1978). According to the theory, if 
unions negotiate higher wages from employers, then the quantity of union labor demanded will fall, 
and the larger labor supply to nonunion firms will forces wages down in that sector. Id. at 205. This 
“crowding” effect of higher union wages also leads to the creation of “dual labor markets,” where 
nonunion workers are forced into tenuous, lower-paying jobs. Id. at 205-06. Kahn identified the 
“crowding” effect as being a long run trend that could subvert unionism either by creating hostility 
among nonunion workers or by alienating nonunion employees from the cause of unionism. Id. at 216. 
Strangely enough, the NLRA and organized labor arguably seem to subvert their own purposes—
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unionism might have a harmful effect on that which it seeks to protect: the 
wages and jobs of employees. Further, the “crowding” effect might bring 
about another problem: a lack of efficiency. In addition, forcing wages 
upward may have a stark effect on societal labor efficiency. Theorists have 
acknowledged that, to some extent, unionized workers are less productive 
than their potential.99 
The union “crowding” effect on wages can also impact the economy 
outside of the particular sector in which the unionized firm conducts 
business. The price increase by unionized firms is passed on to consumers, 
and, ultimately, other firms within and outside of the industry of the 
unionized firm must cut personnel because of increasing costs.100 This 
 
 
under Kahn’s theory, if increased union wages alienate nonunionized employees from the cause of 
unionism, then they shall choose to remain unrepresented, and individual employees will bargain 
directly with the employer. 
 99. The popular conception or stereotype that unions are inimical to productivity has some 
support. One commentator notes: 
The proposition that unions enhance productivity . . . flies in the face of massive, if 
unsystematic, evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion. Featherbedding [requiring an 
employer to hire more workers than required] seems a more common attribute of unionized 
than of nonunionized work forces (at least in the private sector); many industries that are 
heavily unionized are notable for their low productivity . . . . 
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 1001 (1984). 
 Although Posner critiqued the productivity of unions, he subsequently came to the defense of 
unions in Duffy by criticizing the employer’s unilateral imposition of a term of employment. 
Ironically, in Duffy, the employer wished to adopt an attendance policy in an attempt to stop tardiness, 
a clear bane on productivity. 233 F.3d at 997. 
 Posner further concluded that unionism intends to, and succeeds in, “[raising] the price of labor 
above the competitive level, and [depressing] the supply of labor below the competitive level.” 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. at 1001. See infra note 100. 
 Posner also questions other theories of union productivity. One such premise is that unions 
increase productivity by establishing grievance procedures that allow for the arbitration of workers’ 
complaints and provide additional job security—“not absolute security, for [workers] can be laid off if 
the firm’s demand for labor declines, but security against being fired other than for good cause 
(determined by means of the grievance machinery) . . . .” RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 357 (5th ed. 1998). Specifically, productivity is increased through the grievance procedure by 
helping employers to detect mistreatment of workers before job turnover becomes abnormal, and by 
providing some job security. Id. Posner discounts this theory with two observations. First, the theory 
fails to explain why employers do not adopt grievance machinery without the presence of a union. Id. 
More importantly, the theory does not explain the “decline of the unionized sector”; Posner suggests 
that the sole purpose for grievance procedures and the resultant job security is “to make it harder for 
the employer to get rid of union supporters.” Id. 
 Peter Levine also addresses the lack of productivity among union workers. Peter Levine, The 
Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 529 (2001). In his article, Levine cites a 
survey conducted by the University of California at Berkeley, which revealed that union members in 
the United States are “less satisfied with their jobs, more eager to quit if they ever become rich, and 
[are] less convinced that their work is important, compared to non-unionized full-time workers.” Id. at 
554 (internal citation omitted). 
 100. Id. at 555. 
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raises the possibility that strong unions would benefit to the detriment of 
weak unions.101 
Some theorists argue that because employers are rational profit or 
utility maximizers, bargaining to impasse with a union may be 
unnecessary.102 To a large extent, an employer’s performance depends on 
the productivity of its workers; if an employer is better off by granting a 
wage increase, it will do so.103 This leads to a transaction that is Pareto 
efficient, which results in gains for society as a whole.104 By allowing 
management to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of 
employment, and allowing employees to respond to the employer’s action 
through changes in productivity (or through other means, such as changing 
employers), the labor market can operate free from the efficiency-
hampering influence of unions.105 
2. The Economic Darwinist Argument 
Conservative labor law theorists might raise an economic Social 
Darwinist argument when discussing the acceptability of unilateral action 
by management. Should weaker unions necessarily be protected from a 
 
 
 101. Id. (citing ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 89 (3d ed. 1989) (“Even if all 
workers were unionized, ‘[i]t would still be possible for strong unions to make gains at the expense of 
weak ones.’”)). Citing an argument proffered by Milton Friedman, Levine further argues that unions 
hurt those among the lower socioeconomic levels because “[unions] have . . . made the incomes of the 
working class more unequal by reducing the opportunities available to the most disadvantaged 
workers.” Id. (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 124 (1962)). Because unions 
force wages upward, the demand for additional labor is diminished, and less skilled workers are 
foreclosed from higher-paying positions that require additional skills and training. 
 102. See Posner, supra note 99, at 1000. 
 103. Id. at 1001. Posner argues that since most employers are rational profit maximizers, granting 
benefits to employees that reduce the costs of production increases productivity, even if the benefits 
from the entire productivity gain are paid to the employees by means of the increased wages. Id. The 
employer is still better off, as its total costs are lower compared to its competitors, and is therefore able 
to increase output and increase profits. Id. Other employers would then follow suit, creating a system 
in which employee complaints serve to increase productivity and lead to gains for both the employer 
and employees. Id. This theory applies when employees trust the employer’s policies and intentions; if 
the workers know that the employer wishes to be a contender in a competitive market, then they are 
more willing to leave decisions to management. Levine, supra note 99, at 548. A logical extension of 
this theory then seems to be that, if employees trust their manager, bargaining with a union to impasse 
is unnecessary, as labor and management will reach a mutually agreeable solution that will both 
benefit the employees, but leave the firm in a position to compete in its market. 
 104. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 2.3c (2d ed. 1999). A transaction is 
Pareto efficient when the total value of the gains outweigh the total value of the losses. 
 105. “[O]ne of the main purposes of any union is to prevent individual workers from competing in 
the labor market.” Levine, supra note 99, at 540. Free markets maximize the production of desired 
goods and allow individual choice; however, unions create a crippling inefficiency in labor markets by 
barring workers from choice in free markets. Id. at 541-42. 
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stronger employer? Might employees be better served by an employer who 
voluntarily caters to their needs? Might employees seek a more effective 
mode or entity of representation when the existing union or representative 
body must accede to the demands or unilateral declarations of an 
employer? Thus far, American labor law has shunned such practices.106 
In many circumstances, bargaining and union protest are unnecessary 
to counter the employer’s unilateral change. So long as an employer’s 
motives for a unilateral change are not coercive or detrimental to its 
employees (especially those changes undertaken in an attempt to 
undermine the union),107 resistance from organized labor is unnecessary, 
and to some extent, counterproductive.108 
 
 
 106. In his article on the balance of power between management and labor under the NLRA, 
James Zimarowski observes: 
Placed in its practical context, a strong argument can be made that powerful employers and 
powerful unions can link mandatory and permissive bargaining issues, backed by costs of 
noncompliance, and thereby negate the impact of the [mandatory-permissive] dichotomy at 
least at the bargaining table. Weak unions and weak employers, it can be argued, cannot 
achieve satisfactory accommodation on mandatory items let alone permissive items . . . . The 
argument has a Darwinesque appeal but ignores the mediating effects of the collective 
bargaining process in easing the undercurrent of unredressed conflict. This argument ignores 
the position of weaker unions and weaker employers.  
James B. Zimarowski, A Primer on Power Balancing Under the National Labor Relations Act, 23 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 47, 73 n.74 (1989). 
 However, why undertake the process of collective bargaining when it may be doomed to failure? 
“[N]o employer ever sought to reserve complete unilateral control unless he expected the negotiations 
to fail; and if such a contract were signed there would have been no joint participation in the terms or 
conditions of the agreement.” Cox, supra note 79, at 1425. 
 107. An example of coercive behavior occurs when an employer refuses to review union 
authorization cards signed by employees and then grants a wage increase in an attempt to persuade his 
employees that union membership and collective bargaining is unnecessary. See, e.g., Riverside Mfg. 
Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 394, 401 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1941). According to the NLRB, in 
a case such as this 
the blow to the Union’s prestige is . . . severe, and the demonstration that so far as the 
[employer] is concerned collective bargaining is neither desirable nor necessary . . . whether 
the [employer] first ascertains the demands of the Union or, as here, forestalls proof of 
majority and, anticipating what the demands of the Union shall be, makes a unilateral 
concession. 
Id. at 407. 
 108. “Unilateral decisions made in the exercise of authority based upon common consent 
expressed in a collective bargaining agreement command a degree of voluntary acceptance from the 
workers which is withheld from determinations based upon the exercise of alleged prerogatives.” Cox 
& Dunlop, supra note 33, at 420-21. In other words, an employer’s unilateral decision to change a 
term or condition of employment, assuming the decision is free from ulterior motives, will generally 
enjoy a certain degree of willing assent employees. 
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B. Regarding Issues of Noneconomic Efficiency and Pragmatism 
1. How Consistently Is the Relevant Law Applied When Determining 
Violations of the Impasse Bargaining Rule? 
The factors identified by the NLRB for determining if an impasse has 
occurred109 are imprecise and thus are applied inconsistently by courts and 
the NLRB. Recent scholarship addresses this question and concludes that 
courts and the NLRB inconsistently apply what are known as the Taft 
factors.110 The “length of negotiations” factor seems particularly 
susceptible to unpredictable application. Impasse has occurred in one 
situation after one twenty-minute bargaining session, while in other 
situations it has not been found after eighteen bargaining sessions, 
indicating a significant amount of imprecision in the application of this 
factor.111 
The “importance of the issues”112 factor has also been applied 
inconsistently. Some see the “importance of the issues” as a function of 
the economic necessity of an employer, and the issue is decided on 
whether the employer is economically justified in rejecting the duty to 
bargain “without regard to the existence of futility.”113 Might the 
prohibition of an employer from unilaterally imposing terms and 
conditions of employment greatly subvert the employer’s economic 
position?  
A seminal question is whether a court can apply the Taft factors 
independent of common-sense judgments about the productivity of future 
negotiations.114 The answer seems to depend on judgments of desirability: 
the market determination of employer-employee relationships versus 
judicial or agency determinations creating labor relations policy. 
 
 
 109. See supra note 5 for a list of the five Taft factors. 
 110. Peter Guylon Earle, Note and Comment, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 
420-21 (1988). 
 111. Id. at 420 nn.104-05. 
 112. See supra note 5. 
 113. Earle, supra note 110, at 423. 
 114. Earle asks whether courts can “[apply] the Taft factors mechanically without regard to 
whether they rationally indicate the presence or absence of futility of further bargaining.” Id. at 426. 
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2. What Was the Congressional Intent in Creating Section 8(a)(5)? 
How Much Governmental Regulation Is Useful? A Countervailing 
Concern: Flexibility for Managers 
Congress passed the Wagner Act to provide workers with significant 
leverage in bargaining with employers; it also adopted the Taft-Hartley 
amendments 1947 to level the playing field and redress some of the 
perceived abuses of organized labor.115 When deciding whether an 
employer may take unilateral action in a particular circumstance under 
Section 8(a)(5), the courts must strike a balance between the role and 
function of the manager versus the importance of employee rights. 
However, there are inherent problems when attempting to construe Section 
8(a)(5) in a manner that protects labor, while simultaneously respecting 
management’s rights. 
Under the policies currently advocated by the Seventh Circuit, its 
allies, and the NLRB, if an employer acts unilaterally on a mandatory 
subject of bargaining contained in the parties’ contract, it violates Section 
8(d), thus indirectly violating Section 8(a)(5).116 If an employer acts 
unilaterally on a mandatory subject of bargaining not contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement, it commits a direct violation of Section 
8(a)(5).117 Unilateral action on permissive topics of bargaining has 
developed into a complex subject, in that certain permissive topics favor 
management, while others favor labor.118 Management would act 
unilaterally to its own benefit, but can only act unilaterally in certain 
limited situations.119 Neither party has flexibility with mandatory subjects 
of bargaining, because the NLRA mandates discussion if either 
management or labor wishes to negotiate the term in question.120 
Employers and managers frequently claim that they need flexibility and 
autonomy in decision making. Managers must be free to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the organization, and some forms of 
unilateral decision-making do not counter the purposes of the NLRA.121  
 
 
 115. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also note 11 and accompanying text. 
 116. Section 8(d) (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000)) requires employee representatives and employers to 
bargain in good faith. See also supra notes 32 through 96 and accompanying text. 
 117. Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 GEO. L.J. 19, 27 (1994). 
 118. Id. at 27-28. 
 119. Id. Further, if management chooses to act unilaterally on a permissive topic that favors itself 
but is covered by a contract, management does not violate Sections 8(d) or 8(a)(5), but may be liable 
for a breach of Section 301 of the NLRA. Id. at 28-29. 
 120. See id. at 24-25. 
 121. “Experience shows that the reservation of specific management functions is consistent with 
the kind of collective bargaining intended by the NLRA.” Cox, supra note 79, at 1425. Such 
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This dilemma leads one to ask an important question: at what point 
does the prohibition upon management’s right to unilaterally impose terms 
and conditions impede management’s economic efficiency? Protection of 
workers must be balanced with management’s right to make a profit. 
Many theorists and economists emphasize that, to run a profitable 
business, managers must have some freedom in bargaining.122 
Further, problems of statutory interpretation plague application of the 
relevant laws by the courts and the NLRB. Pragmatism is lacking; legal 
principles are mechanically applied with no review of standards, practices, 
or needs of particular industries.123 Some have even made the argument 
that statutory interpretation is too static to accommodate the inherently 
fluid nature of collective bargaining.124 
 
 
permissive action is certainly allowed on permissive subjects of bargaining that favor management. 
See Hylton, supra note 117, at 28. 
 122. Zimarowski, supra note 106 at 73 n.74 (1989). In making this argument, Zimarowski relies 
on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 
U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981). In addition to leaving management free to make a profit, more liberal 
enforcement of mandatory impasse bargaining allows management 
some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions without 
fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct as an unfair labor practice. Congress did not 
explicitly state what issues of mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude 
from mandatory bargaining.  
Id. at 679. Indeed, decisions regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining have been variable, and, at 
times, even inconsistent through the years. Id. at 679 n.18. 
 123. “The statutory duty to bargain collectively should be left sufficiently flexible to permit 
drawing the line between management’s exclusive functions and joint labor-management 
responsibilities at different points in different industries.” Cox & Dunlop, supra note 33, at 427. A 
number of factors must be considered when determining whether an employer should be required to 
bargain; a superficial application of legal factors or inflexible adherence to precedent without inquiry 
into a case’s particular facts fails to satisfy this need. Id. at 428. The failure to inquire into industry-
specific needs troubled Cox and Dunlop, who reasoned that the lack of such an investigation was a 
consequence “of the initial assumption that an employer is required to bargain (in some sense of the 
term) about each and every subject covered by the words ‘rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, 
or other conditions of employment.’” Id. 
 124. Id. at 431. Cox and Dunlop offer the premise that statutory interpretation is not suitable for 
collective bargaining: 
Collective bargaining is too dynamic to permit drawing a statutory line between 
management’s prerogatives and the areas of joint responsibility . . . . Arrangements 
established by collective bargaining in one contract are frequently changed by the next. Even 
within the union movement there is no consensus of opinion. Some unions appear constantly 
to seek a larger share in the governance of the industry while others believe that they should 
avoid responsibility for the conduct of the business. A line drawn by statutory interpretation 
would be unduly rigid not only because of its universality but also because of its permanence. 
Once made, decisions could be altered only by revision of the statute. The fluidity of private 
arrangements is much to be preferred. 
Id. at 430-31 (footnotes omitted). 
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3. Will Employers Resort to Other Means to Achieve the Ends They 
Desire? 
Scholars have noted that if an employer is denied from using one 
power, it will find other means to bring about comparable ends.125 
Individuals and organizations tend to take positions that maximize the 
exercise of power; namely, positioning foundations of power in the most 
beneficial, self-serving manner.126 But does unilateral action by employers 
lead to more efficient results for society? As employers generally seek to 
maximize profit127 (and presumably utility), they will seek other means to 
reach the ends they desire. An example: a union seeks to increase the wage 
scale for workers, but the employer refuses, citing decreased profits. 
Actually, the employer desired to decrease payroll expenditures through a 
slight wage cut. The parties then bargain to impasse regarding pay rates 
for employees. The employer then closes a plant, resulting in the desired 
savings.128 The employer has bypassed the impasse bargaining 
requirement through alternate means—in this case, using a plant closure to 
achieve the same result as a payroll cut. 
IV. FINDINGS 
The Fifth Circuit’s policy is not as harmful as indicated by the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Duffy. In fact, the policy advocated by the Fifth 
Circuit actually enhances efficiency and free market operation. 
The Fifth Circuit’s policy allows for an efficient use of economic 
weapons. Such a policy might foster agreement: the specter of unilateral 
change by the employer or a strike by the union might lead to further 
sessions at the bargaining table in an effort to stave off the detrimental 
effects of the use of economic weapons. Further, unilateral demands by 
unions can ultimately have negative effects across society—on other 
 
 
 125. Zimarowski, supra note 106, at 70. “If a specific power exercise is denied, a party will shift 
to another power exercise, albeit perhaps a less timely and effective one, to achieve similar results and 
impacts.” Id. 
 126. Id. “Power sources, whether from bargaining, managerial, or rationing transactions, are 
tactically mixed to produce impacts in furtherance of a party’s interests.” Id. 
 127. See supra note 103. 
 128. If an employer can demonstrate that bargaining would be a substantial burden and that its 
need for flexibility and freedom in its operations outweighs the interest served by union participation, 
the decision to close a plant is not covered by Section 8(d) of the NLRA. See First Nat. Maint. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679-83 (1981). Hence, a plant closing under such circumstances does not violate 
Section 8(a)(5). Id. 
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sectors of workers, on prices paid by consumers, and on the efficiency of 
industry.129 
Requiring an employer to bargain to impasse under threat of Section 
8(a)(5) sanctions harms market efficiency. Unions are given an inordinate 
amount of power, resulting in gross societal inefficiencies. Other workers 
may be injured by a union’s insistence on higher wages. By allowing 
employers to institute unilateral changes on the terms and conditions of 
employment, workers display a level of confidence in their employer. If 
the policy adopted by the employer is disagreeable, workers have a 
number of options, including, but not limited to, quelling productivity and 
finding new employment.130 
Further, an employer’s unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of 
employment does not indicate that a union is a “paper tiger.”131 If a union 
has sufficient strength, it should be able to employ economic weapons to 
counter the employer’s unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of 
employment. Strikes and other economic weapons are readily available to 
pressure the employer’s policy decisions. If a union is unable to influence 
an employer, then perhaps its constituents should use provisions of the 
NLRA, such as decertification elections, to find a bargaining 
representative with more power.132 Viewing the issue from a rather 
Darwinist position, employees are not left without recourse, as they will 
find an appropriate method of representation.133 
The statutory scheme presently employed when adjudging unilateral 
action by employers is too variable and inconsistent to effectively guide 
 
 
 129. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 132. The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA support this contention. See supra notes 2 and 
11. 
 133. It has been noted that most unions have not “achieved sufficient economic power to maintain 
unilateral control over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Cox, supra note 
79, at 1424. However, the question here does not involve complete unilateral control by one party or 
the other; rather, it addresses bargaining power and the most efficient means of achieving agreement.  
 Further, Professor Cox contends that an employer normally seeks and negotiates an employment 
contract with a union; the employer will not exert unilateral control unless it expects bargaining to fail. 
Id. at 1425. Seemingly inherent in this statement is the notion that the two parties are irreconcilably 
distant in their demands. In such a case, perhaps unilateral imposition of terms and conditions by an 
employer would serve to move bargaining away from an impasse and toward productive discussions. It 
seems reasonable to assume that an employer will not institute unreasonable terms; as an employer is 
usually a rational profit maximizer, it will seek to avoid an outcome that would cause itself economic 
harm by striking workers, negative publicity, mass layoffs, or other detriments. See supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. The employer, then, must institute reasonable terms that can serve as a 
springboard for later negotiations. 
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employers away from violations of Section 8(a)(5).134 Principles, such as 
those from Taft, are applied seemingly by reflex, without considering the 
peculiar characteristics and needs of specific industries. This lack of 
flexibility ultimately impedes managers in their pursuit of efficiency and 
profitability. 
Prohibiting an employer from instituting unilateral terms and 
conditions of employment will cause it to achieve its goals through 
another method.135 Even if integrative bargaining is used, a party will not 
be satisfied with the resolution of all issues. Therefore, other methods will 
be employed to achieve the desired ends. Imposition of the impasse 
bargaining rule works an inefficiency on the market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit’s policy of permitting unilateral changes to terms and 
conditions of employment, after providing the employees’ bargaining 
representative with notice and a chance to provide counterproposals, rather 
than requiring complete impasse, does not have the harmful effect 
suggested by the Seventh Circuit. Rather, it promotes efficiency and 
benefits the bargaining process. 
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